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Abstract Public Key Infrastructure is a widely deployed security technology for
handling key distribution and validation in computer security. Despite PKI’s popu-
larity as a security solution, Phishing and other Man-in-the-Middle related attacks
are accomplished with ease throughout our computer networks. The major problems
with PKI come down to trust, and largely, how much faith we must place in crypto-
graphic keys alone to establish authenticity and identity. In this chapter, we look at
a novel biometric solution that mitigates this problem at both the user and certiﬁcate
authority levels. More importantly, we analyze the problem of applying unprotected
biometric features directly into PKI, and propose the integration of a secure, revoca-
ble biometric template protection technology that supports transactional key release.
A detailed explanation of this new Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure is provided,
including composition, enrollment, authentication, and revocation details. The BKI
provides a new paradigm for blending elements of physical and virtual security to
address network attacks that more conventional approaches have not been able to
stop.
1 Introduction
To motivate the contribution of this paper, we ﬁrst turn to the technology that under-
pins the problem. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [10, 1, 9, 30] has been a popular,
yet often maligned technology since its widespread adoption in the 1990s. PKI (Fig-
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ure 1) is the infrastructure for handling the complete management of digital certiﬁ-
cates (x.509 compliant), which contain a piece of trusted information: a public key.
PKI attempts to solve an important problem in key management - namely, how can
Alice verify that Bob’s public key is really Bob’s? Addressing this problem remains
a paramount concern, as the Internet has experienced an explosion of successful
Phishing and other Man-in-the-Middle attacks in recent years. Users of networks,
both those well-informed and those blissfully ignorant of security protocols, rou-
tinely ignore security provisions put into place by PKI to guard them against such
attacks (how often have you blindly clicked through a browser certiﬁcate warning?).
Sadly, providers of information security services are also to blame, by providing
PKI as a catch-all security solution, and ignoring its limitations.
Fig. 1 An overview of Public Key Infrastructure. A website owner, Alice, wants to obtain a digital
certiﬁcate for her web store. She applies to a Registration Authority (RA) with her public key for
the certiﬁcate. The RA conﬁrms Alice’s identity, and then contacts the Certiﬁcate Authority (CA),
which issues the certiﬁcate. With a valid certiﬁcate, Alice can now digitally sign off on contracts
involving her web store. Alice’s identity can be conﬁrmed when visitors to her web store present
her certiﬁcate to a Validation Authority (VA), which receives information about issued certiﬁcates
from the CA.
The problems with PKI [16, 15] are well-known, and have remained mostly un-
solved thus far. Ellison and Schneier [14] speciﬁcally highlight a series of identity
related PKI risks by asking the following questions:
1. Who do we trust, and what for?
2. Who is using my key?Beyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 3
3. Is a name a unique identiﬁer?
4. Is the user part of the security design?
5. How did the CA identify the certiﬁcate holder?
The overarching criticism stems back to the notion of trust in a PKI system - why
would we place any trust in a system with entities (both certiﬁcate authorities and
users) signifying their identities with only randomly generated keys? A practical and
recent attack [35, 36] highlights the ease with which a rogue certiﬁcate authority
can be established, using an MD5 hash collision attack against the digital signatures
used for certiﬁcate validation (illustrated in Figure 2). With all trust being placed in
digital signatures, presumedly derived from legitimate keys, there is no way to tell
the difference between a Man-in-the-Middle and a legitimate site - if a collision has
been located that matches the legitimate certiﬁcate’s signature. While MD5 enables
the attack in this instance, the entire infrastructure will always be susceptible to
trust related attacks if any cryptographic component is ﬂawed. What if we extend
the notion of trust beyond keys to include identity speciﬁc information?
By adding a second factor, we can mitigate these inherent identity related trust
problems with PKI. Biometrics, those methods of uniquely recognizing humans
based on physiognomy or behavior have become ubiquitous in many areas of tech-
nology and society, and are mature to the point of being generally accepted as valid
andusefulsecuritytools.ForPKI,theadditionofbiometricdatahasaveryattractive
feature - if a user or certiﬁcate authority presents a key and biometric during some
action, we have more conﬁdence that this action is legitimate (but this does not ab-
solutely prove that the owner of the key and biometric actually performed the action
- stolen keys and spooﬁng attacks are not prevented by two-factor authentication).
With biometrics, we have improved non-repudiation. A series of related concerns
follow the trust problem: the security of the verifying computer, certiﬁcate authority
establishment, and general certiﬁcate issue. With the proper protocols including a
biometric component, we can address each of these.
But to solve these problems correctly, we cannot simply use standard biomet-
ric templates (the data representation of the collected biometric feature) embedded
within x.509 certiﬁcates, because a revocation of raw biometric data can only hap-
pen for a limited number of times (we have 1 face, 2 irises, 10 ﬁngers). ISO/IEC
19794-2 standard templates, while being an abstract representation of the original
biometric features, are still effectively invertible [8]. Moreover, unprotected bio-
metric data that is even under the control of “trusted” entities is still vulnerable to
attack. To understand why, we ﬁrst must take a look at Figure 3, which depicts what
we term the Biometric Dilemma. In essence, as the use of biometrics increases, so
does the chance for compromise. If a malicious attacker, Mallory, wishes to imper-
sonate Alice at an area of high security, she can obtain the exact biometric data she
needs from a different, much lower security area. How well might Alice’s gym be
protecting her biometric data that she uses to access her locker? Low-hanging fruit
is plentiful, and can often be obtained legitimately. In 2001, the state of Colorado
tried to sell its DMV face and ﬁngerprint databases [22] to anyone who wanted to
buy them. The resulting protests moved the data back off the market, but the state
still offers them to any requesting law enforcement agency.4 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
Fig. 2 The chosen-preﬁx collision attack of [36]. A malicious attacker, Mallory, wishes to deploy a
rogue website that after a redirect attack will look identical to a legitimate online retailer, with valid
certiﬁcates. To accomplish this, she requests a legitimate website certiﬁcate from a real CA (cert. in
upper right of the diagram). Mallory crafts a rogue CA certiﬁcate (light gray cert. in the diagram)
by copying the signature from her legitimate website certiﬁcate to an illegitimate CA certiﬁcate.
SheisabletodothisbycreatingaCAcertiﬁcatethatwillcollidewiththelegitimatesignaturewhen
the same hash function is applied. Mallory can now create a rogue website certiﬁcate (dark gray
cert. in the diagram) that bears the the online retailer’s identity, but contains a different public key
and is signed by the rogue CA. When Bob is redirected to the rogue website, he can successfully
validate in sequence the rogue website’s certiﬁcate, the rogue CA’s certiﬁcate and the real CA’s
root certiﬁcate. The transaction will appear to be legitimate.
A second, and equally dangerous attack is what we term the doppelganger threat,
which takes advantage of the operational security performance characteristics of the
underlying biometric matching algorithm. If the False Accept Rate (FAR) of a sys-
tem is 1 in X attempts, then a doppelganger attack consists of trying more than X
different biometric samples. This attack is the biometric equivalent of a dictionary
attack. Once again, one need not break the law to gather the data necessary for a
successful attack. The hundreds of thousands of ﬁngerprints that are publicly avail-
able (including four well known algorithm challenges [5], testing data from NIST
[27], and even 100,000+ prints being offered by a private company [13]) provide at
least a basic doppelganger dictionary for anyone willing to spend a small amount of
money.
Previous work on the integration of biometrics into PKI has not considered the
biometric dilemma or doppelganger attack, favoring a simplistic unsecured appli-
cation of biometrics. Proposed standards for PKI with biometrics go back to the
mid 1990s, with recommendations from the defense space [29], commercial Inter-Beyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 5
Fig. 3 The biometric dilemma: as the usage and storage of biometric data increases, so does the
vulnerability. A malicious attacker, Mallory, may obtain Alice’s biometric data with relative ease
from a low/no security source (possibly through a legitimate transaction) to attack a high security
target. The indiscriminate use of biometrics makes this threat possible, and if not addressed, limits
the integration of biometrics into existing security infrastructure like PKI.
net related interests [40], and NIST [23]. Both Benavente [3] and Martinez-Silva
et al. [25] suggest augmenting x.509 certiﬁcates with BioAPI [4], which provides
the templates and matching capability needed to use the biometric data. Dawson
et al. [11] also recommend augmenting x.509 certiﬁcates with biometric data, as
part of a much larger defense-in-depth approach to authentication. Finally, Kwon
and Moon [24] suggest the use of a biometric PKI scheme for border control ap-
plications. These previous standards recommendations and research works do not
place adequate safeguards around biometric data. All store and match unprotected
templates, and have no facility for biometric template revocation and re-issue.
In response to the threat of permanent biometric feature compromise, very re-
cent research [18] has emerged from both the pattern recognition and cryptogra-
phy communities to address the problem of biometric template security. Solutions
to this problem create a transformation of original biometric features that can be
matched in an encoded space, and revoked and reissued if a compromise is de-
tected, in much the same manner as a traditional password or PIN. For unattended6 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
Fig. 4 The Doppelganger Threat. What happens when a large database of biometric data is stolen,
hacked, or sold? For example, consider a database containing unique records for 4 Million individ-
uals. If the matching system is operating at a False Accept Rate (FAR) of 1 in 1,000, a malicious
attacker in possession of the database may, on average, be given a choice of approximately 4,000
identities to use to compromise the matching system. Even at a FAR of 1 in 1,000,000, the attacker
still gets four choices, on average, to compromise the matching system.
network authentication, the risk of spooﬁng is greatly reduced by secure templates.
Unique templates can be generated for different domains and applications, making a
template harvested by an attacker at one domain useless when applied to a different
domain. This addresses the biometric dilemma described above. A wide variety of
approaches have been proposed in the literature, including non-invertible transforms
[28], fuzzy commitment [20], fuzzy vaults [19], fuzzy extractors [12], BioHashing
[37], and revocable biotokens [38]. Even more interesting for trusted data transfer is
that certain classes of these schemes support key release upon successful matching.
Key-binding biometric cryptosystems bind key data with the biometric data. Key-
generating biometric cryptosystems derive the key data from the biometric data.
Both classes support a key release that may be used for cryptographic applications,
including standard symmetric key cryptography, where key storage is problematic.
Secure templates enable completely new ways to transfer secret information.
Consider a key-binding biometric cryptosystem where the key can be bound even
after enrollment and which also provides public secure templates that can be used
in the same manner as a public key. With these components, we have the building
blocks for a Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure. The primary beneﬁt (Figure 5) ofBeyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 7
Fig. 5 The primary beneﬁt of a Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure: the ability to store public
biotokens in digital certiﬁcates. Any entity in the infrastructure can send secret data that only the
owner of the biotoken can unlock. In this example, Alice wants to convey a secret message to Bob.
Bob’s public biotoken can be retrieved from his certiﬁcate, allowing Alice to transform it into a
bipartite biotoken, which conveys an embedded secret. Alice has assurance that an identity must
be present to unlock the secret – not just a key.
such an infrastructure is the ability to store public templates (referred to in this arti-
cle as biotokens) in x.509 compliant digital certiﬁcates. Through a transformation of
a public template with an embedded secret (the transformed template is referred to
in this article as a bipartite biotoken) by an entity that wants to convey information
to the template’s owner, secure key exchange and unique transactions can be sup-
ported. Only the owner of the public biotoken can unlock the secret. By adding this
biometrically derived data to a certiﬁcate, an additional component must validated
(with the help of a validation authority in possession of enrollment data), making
attacks such as the one described above much more difﬁcult to perpetrate.
The rest of this chapter introduces the details for the Biocryptographic Key In-
frastructure. In Section 2, the fundamental biometric requirements are deﬁned, in-
cluding the properties necessary for protecting the biometric data, secure key re-
lease, and revocation support. In Section 3 our full infrastructure is described, in-
cluding a description of the overall composition, the enrollment process for both
biometric certiﬁcate authorities and users, the certiﬁcate validation process, authen-
tication protocols, and revocation and re-issue procedures. Section 4 takes these
ideas into the real world with suggestions on how BKI can be applied in place of
PKI with stronger security. In the concluding remarks of Section 5, we make the8 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
case for standards consideration of revocable biometric template technologies and
BKI.
2 Fundamental Biometric Requirements for BKI
Many different secure template technologies exist, but not all are appropriate for use
in a PKI-like framework. To be useful for PKI, a secure template technology must
possess the following properties:
1. Cryptographically strong protection of the underlying biometric features.
2. The ability to revoke and re-issue the template.
3. Nested re-encoding, allowing a hierarchy of templates to be generated from a
single base template.
4. Support for public templates that cannot be used to match other public templates,
and private templates that are generated dynamically from a biometric sample
during matching and immediately discarded following.
5. Key-binding capability without the need of intervention by the person associated
with the template.
The ﬁrst and second properties ensure resilience against the biometric dilemma and
doppelganger attacks by not exposing the original biometric features during match-
ing, allowing the creation of application speciﬁc templates, and rendering a com-
promised template useless by replacing it with a new template via different cryp-
tographic keys and/or transformations. Cryptographically strong protection implies
that it should not be feasible for an attacker to retrieve the original biometric features
from a compromised secure template without knowledge of relevant transformation
information (such as keys used to protect the biometric data). The third, fourth, and
ﬁfth properties guarantee the PKI-like operations we’d like our secure templates to
possess to be useful for protocols common to PKI.
Throughout the rest of this chapter, we will use revocable biotokens [38, 32, 33]
as a case study for the BKI described herein, though any secure template technology
supporting the ﬁve aforementioned properties could be used. To date, only revoca-
ble biotokens support all ﬁve. Some secure template technologies are appropriate
for authentication protocols [41, 39] but lack support for key transfer, while others
support key transfer [7] but lack the ﬂexibility for unique transactions. A scheme
such as the one presented in [21] could be used to support some of the functional-
ity of BKI (namely requirement 5), though it does not support nested re-encoding
and is susceptible to attack1. We brieﬂy introduce the fundamentals for revocable
biotokens in the remainder of this section as an illustration of the biometric require-
ments. Interested readers should refer back to the prior published work on revocable
1 Thetemplatedescribedin[21]consistsofasecretkey+errorcorrectionqps XORed withshufﬂed
biometric data qcanc, yielding qlock. If an attacker knows qps, they can simply XOR it with qlock,
yielding qcanc, which can be used by the attacker to match from that point forward. This is a
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biotokens [38, 32, 33] for modality speciﬁc algorithm details and security analysis,
though that level of depth is not necessary to understand the higher level concepts
that enable BKI.
The notion of data splitting to support revocable biotokens was introduced by
Boult et al. [38]. In general, encrypted biometric data cannot be matched, because
of the unstable nature of the data, which can vary as a function of environment, age,
and acquisition circumstances. However, many biometric modalities yield features
that can be split into stable and unstable (or residual) components. By encrypting
the stable component, matching can occur in the encrypted space because this por-
tion of the data is not impacted by any instability at the bit level. Additional residual
matching adds accuracy [38]. Using this knowledge, and the concept of public key
cryptography, we can develop the re-encoding methodology for revocable bioto-
kens. The re-encoding property, introduced by Scheirer and Boult [32], is essential
for supporting a viable transactional framework - tokens with unique data must be
generated quickly and automatically to support cryptographic transactions (such as
session key exchange). The bipartite biotoken form of a revocable biotoken sup-
ports data-binding (key-binding) at the transactional level. Bipartite biotoken gen-
eration from a stored biotoken allows the required data release when only matching
against tokens generated from data derived from original biometric features during
the course of the transaction.
Assuming the biometric produces a value v that is obfuscated via scaling and
translation to v0 = (v t)s, the resulting v0 is split into the stable component q,
and the the residual component r. The amount of stable and unstable data is a func-
tion of the biometric modality being considered. In a basic scheme, for a user j,
their residual rj(v0) is left un-encoded. For the initial transformation wj;1(qj(v0);T1)
some transformation function T (which may be a strong hash function like SHA-
256 that is minimally impacted by collision attacks, or another application of public
key cryptography) is applied. For nested re-encodings, wj is re-encoded using fur-
ther transformations, creating a unique new encoding for each hash or key that is
applied: wj;1(qj(v0);T1); wj;2(wj;1;T2);:::;wj;n(wj;n 1;Tn)
If public key cryptography is used for every transformation, the nesting process
can be securely invertible if the private keys all the way back to the ﬁrst stage (the
root) of encoding are available. Partially inverting the nesting facilitates revocation
and automatic re-issue of the biotoken, which is an attractive feature for the BKI
system. A tree introducing our standard hierarchy of biotokens with descriptions
for each is shown in Figure 6. We note that any public keys used for encoding here
are strictly for this biotoken generation process, and are different from the keys
contained in the user’s certiﬁcate. With this nesting in mind, we can deﬁne three
properties for the bipartite biotoken:
1. Let B be a secure biotoken, as described in [38]. A bipartite biotoken BB is a
transformation bbj;k of user j’s kth transformation of B. This transformation sup-
ports matching in encoded space of any bipartite biotoken instance BB;k with any
secure biotoken instance Bk for the biometric features of a user j and a common
series of transforms T1, T2, ..., Tk.10 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
Fig. 6 The biotoken issue/re-issue tree. Biotokens can be re-encoded, starting from the root token
generatedatenrollmenttime,throughsubsequentapplicationsofpublickeyencryption(supporting
automatic revocation and re-issue), or a hash function.
2. The transformation bbj;k must allow the embedding of some data d into BB, rep-
resented as: bbj;k(wj;k;Tk;d).
3. The matching of Bk and BB;k must release d if successful.
The design of bipartite biotokens that satisﬁes the above properties is an exten-
sion of the fuzzy vault [19] concept, where a polynomial embedding hides the data
d. The bipartite representation implements Reed-Solomon (RS) for error correction,
and does not store the points at which the embedded polynomial is evaluated. For
efﬁciency, we choose to work over a Galois Field of size 28, where the coefﬁcients
and evaluation points are all 8 bit quantities. We represent the data d to be stored
as a K-byte block, with E bytes of error correction, yielding a total payload block
N = K+E. The polynomial encodes the N bytes of data. The Reed-Solomon poly-Beyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 11
nomial representing the N byte payload body is then evaluated at a set of points,
with the value of the resulting polynomial stored in the template.
For illustrative purposes, assume that a biometric sample produces three features
a1;a2;a3 that must be protected. Let sa1;sa2;sa3 be the stable components of these
features, and let ra1;ra2;ra3 be the residuals. For polynomial evaluation, the 24 bits
of sa1;sa2;sa3 are hashed into i, an 8 bit quantity that is stored in the template. The
value i is then hashed, per transaction, a second time to deﬁne the point at which the
polynomial is evaluated. To support multiple embedded data “columns,” this second
hash h is evaluated for different polynomials yielding values rs1;:::;rs4. Note the
evaluation point/hash value h is not stored.
The result is an “encoded bipartite row” that contains the unprotected ﬁelds and 6
protected ﬁelds (the encoded stable ﬁeld w used for matching, index i and 4 columns
of evaluated polynomials). For data d that is less than 512 bits we spread the data
over columns in 16 rows; above 512 bits, we spread equally over the columns taking
as many rows as needed. We require at least 14 rows, and pad d if it does not require
4 columns to represent it. The location of w is randomized per row. The evaluated
Reed-Solomon polynomials for the 4 key columns, rs1;:::;rs4, follow w using a
circular mapping of the 6 slots. For example, if the random index was 3, then the
sequence would be: [rs3;rs4;w;rs1;rs2;i]
When matching a probe, the system creates all the ﬁelds for each of its rows,
including the “un-stored” hash value h for polynomial evaluation. A probe row po-
tentially matches a gallery row if it ﬁnds a matching w among the encoded ﬁelds
and the residuals (ra1;ra2;ra3) are within some threshold. This test is necessary, but
not sufﬁcient, for a correct match. With w identiﬁed, the algorithm can then extract
the evaluated polynomial values, rs1;:::;rs4. If w is incorrectly identiﬁed, if the row
is an accidental match, or if the underlying hash value h is incorrect (because of a
random collision in generating/matching w), some values labeled rs1;:::;rs4 will be
extracted, but will be incorrect. We extract the k values for each of the j embedded
data columns and obtain a set of hash evaluation points hj and their Reed-Solomon
polynomial evaluations rsj;k at the associated points.
Now comes one of the important implementation details, addressing both secu-
rity and efﬁciency. One could effectively improve robustness by increasing the level
of ECC, but doing so increases the ease with which an attacker can compromise d.
Instead we use a two level hashing to improve robustness. Our two level hashing
will, in general, map multiple sa1;sa2;sa3 sets to the same index. Next, a procedure
is followed to collect the multiple values during the mapping, check for consistency
and use that consistency to help resolve any conﬂicts that arise when noisy data is
mapped. The consistency check accounts for noise in the matching process, and the
many-to-one mapping that permits non-unique mapping results. The result of the
mapping and consistency check is a vector of length N polynomial values (some of
which may be missing) that holds the values of the evaluated Reed-Solomon poly-
nomial for each location. The vector of length N, with gaps marked, is used as input
to the Reed-Solomon decode function, which allows us to recover d with up to g
gaps and e errors, as long as 2g+e < E, where E is the number of ECC bytes used.
Each key column is recovered separately, with larger keys being the concatenation12 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
of multiple columns. For added security, a checksum is computed over the 6 unpro-
tected columns of the enrollment biotoken. The data d are XORed with a checksum
before embedding, and again after decoding, which prevents any tampering with the
biotoken.
When implemented, the above design for bipartite biotokens lays the foundation
for the protocols of BKI. The primary beneﬁt of BKI is the ability to store public
biotokens that any user in a particular infrastructure can retrieve and use to generate
a bipartite biotoken to send some secret back to the owner of the biotoken, with the
assurance that the certiﬁcate containing the biotoken is valid (a validation process
is described in Section 3.1). The security of such a scheme to publicly distribute
biotokens derived from biometrics is of course a concern. It has been shown [38, 33]
that revocable biotokens are cryptographically secure and guard against the secure
template attacks of Scheirer and Boult [31]. Considering the doppelganger attack of
Section 1, prior work [33] shows a test of over 500 Million impostor trials, with no
false accepts - possibly the largest trial to date for this sort of test.
The amount of information leaked by the residual component of the biotoken,
in an information theoretical sense, has yet to be analyzed. However, while un-
encoded, this information is still protected via the obfuscation scheme of folding
the residual data back into the encrypted stable data, thus hiding its original posi-
tion (described in Section 2 of [38]). Thus, an attacker would have to resolve the
positional ambiguity of the residual data, before beginning to mount some sort of
correlational attack with the collected residuals from multiple biotokens. The varia-
tional and very limited nature of the residual data (4 bytes per row component of the
Bozorth ﬁngerprint implementation [38]) makes their value as a unique identiﬁer
questionable. We also note that the residuals can be discarded, leading to a small
reduction in accuracy when just the stable components of the features are matched,
thus completely alleviating this concern. From these considerations, we have conﬁ-
dence that revocable biotokens can be used in a public setting.
3 A Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure
A Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure must incorporate elements from several dif-
ferent domains, including biometrics, cryptography and network security. Network
entities (including clients and servers), enrollment procedures, validation proce-
dures, data structures, authentication protocols and revocation protocols are all nec-
essary for a fully functional infrastructure. Here we examine those details.
3.1 Composition, Enrollment and Validation
An overview of the Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure is shown in Figure 7. Sev-
eral distinct entities are shown in the BKI graph. Biometric Certiﬁcate Authori-Beyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 13
Fig. 7 Overview of Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure ﬂow. The BKI can be viewed as a graph
of interconnected nodes, each with a speciﬁc role. In a particular BKI, we ﬁnd a root Biometric
Certiﬁcate Authority (BCA), as we would have a root authority in PKI. The BCA trust path follows
back centrally to the root, with individual local BCAs managing their own end-user enrollees.
Ofﬂine BKI components (standalone computers or private networks) can also be supported.
ties (BCAs) are certiﬁcate authorities that support both public keys and revocable
biotokens, and are biometrically veriﬁed by higher-level authorities, in a process
described in detail below. As in PKI, a central root authority exists to authorize all
BCAs below it. Enrollment and key management follows from each BCA up to the
root. Auth Stations exist at the outermost regions of the graph, and are the places
where users submit their biometric samples to generate enrollment biotokens or
biotokens for a particular session. Report Engines can also be deployed throughout
the BKI graph to propagate registration and transaction reports to other authorities.
In order to support the biotoken, we add some additional ﬁelds to the base x.509
v3 certiﬁcate via its extensions provision, similar to the approach of Martinez-Silva
et al. [25]. This is shown in Figure 8. We can use certiﬁcates in both an online and
ofﬂine setting, as is shown in Figure 7. If we are operating in an ofﬂine setting,
such as a standalone computer or private network, we are not able to connect to
BCAs on outside networks, including the root. In order to indicate the operating
mode to the underlying BKI software, the certiﬁcate contains an “Online Only”
ﬂag and an “Ofﬂine Only” ﬂag. For the user’s biotoken, we ﬁrst note the type of
biotoken included. Recall from Figure 6 that a tree of different biotokens exists14 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
Fig. 8 Digital certiﬁcate supporting both public keys and biotokens.
for a particular user, with the possibility of a Root Biotoken, Master Biotoken, or
Operational Biotoken being included in a certiﬁcate. Following the “Biotoken type”
ﬂag, the biotoken itself is included.
We need BCAs to trust each other, and we need to be able to place some trust
in our end-users. To do this, we need an enrollment process where we require that
someone biometrically register with the root BCA, which can search for this person
in the existing records. To introduce an increased level of trust with biometrics,
the standard Certiﬁcate Signing Request (CSR) [30] is augmented as per Figure 9.
The CSR is the message sent to a CA by a user requesting a new certiﬁcate. The
augmentation takes advantage of the open nature of registration information detail
for new text ﬁelds, and the open extensions in the certiﬁcate template, as deﬁned by
[30].
Speciﬁcally for enrollment, BKI requires that a representative of an organization
making a request generate an enrollment biotoken, which is passed up to the root
authority for a duplicate enrollment check (which can tell us if this person been
ﬂagged as a malicious user, or if they are impersonating someone else). The en-
rollment biotoken is always generated as a Root Biotoken (Figure 6) using the root
authority’s public key, to enable matching across all enrollees (if keys differ between
enrollments at this stage, it will not be possible to match any of them). The enroll-
ment token is stored at the root BCA for use in all future enrollment checks. While
this does not protect the privacy of the organizational representative at the databaseBeyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 15
Fig. 9 A modiﬁcation of the typical CSR message, including biotoken enrollment information.
level, it does maintain the integrity of the BCA establishment, and still protects the
security of the representative’s biometric data. This process is illustrated in Figure
10.
The same process follows for end users, except the enrollment token need not
be passed up all the way back to the root from the user’s Auth Station; more local
BCAs can manage it. This is also illustrated in Figure 10. For both BCA and end
user certiﬁcates, the validation process includes an analysis of the certiﬁcate with a
BCA that is established as a VA. This is similar to the standard process for PKI, with
a further step of biotoken validation to ensure a Man-in-the-Middle has not replaced
the public biotoken in the certiﬁcate with his own. From a stored operational bioto-
ken at the BCA, a local biotoken can be generated and matched against a bipartite
biotoken generated from the public biotoken in question [32]. If the match is suc-
cessful, then the certiﬁcate can be validated. This reduces the threat of the collision
attack described in Section 1 in both the BCA and user scenarios, since an attacker
would have to ﬁnd a hash collision that validates the rogue certiﬁcate and compro-
mise biometric data that will correctly match against the biotoken of the authorized
representative of the BCA or end user.16 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
3.2 Authentication Framework
BCAE
BCAD
BCAC
BCAA
BCAB
Alice
Bob
Representative of BCAD is biometrically 
authorized by BCAE; certiﬁcate signed by BCAC.
Representative of BCAC is biometrically 
authorized by BCAE; certiﬁcate signed by BCAA.
Alice’s enrollment biotoken is 
validated by BCAA.  Alice’s 
certiﬁcate, including her public key 
and public biotoken, is certiﬁed.
Bob’s enrollment biotoken is 
validated by BCAB. Bob’s certiﬁcate, 
including his public key and biotoken, 
is certiﬁed.
BCAE biometrically authorizes a representative of 
BCAB; BCAD signs BCAB’s certiﬁcate.
Root BCA, biometrically and cryptographically 
authorizes all BCAs below.
Fig. 10 The path from Alice, who wants to obtain Bob’s certiﬁcate, to BCAB, which certiﬁes Bob’s
certiﬁcate, and ultimately Bob, who possess a certiﬁcate with his public key and biotoken.
For authentication, we must ﬁrst understand how certiﬁcates are retrieved by par-
ties wishing to communicate with some properly certiﬁed entity in the BKI struc-
ture. This procedure follows from PKI [34]. In Figure 10, an example of certiﬁcate
retrieval is depicted, whereby a user Alice traverses an infrastructure composed of
ﬁve different BCAs (BCAA;:::;BCAE) to retrieve another user Bob’s certiﬁcate. Al-
ice’s certiﬁcate containing her public key and biotoken is certiﬁed by BCAA; Bob’s
is certiﬁed by BCAB. BACC has a certiﬁcate signed by BCAA, so Alice can begin fol-
lowing the path through the graph to Bob. BCAD has a certiﬁcate signed by BCAC,
and BCAB has a certiﬁcate signed by BCAD. By moving through the graph to BCAD,
and then down to Bob, Alice can validate Bob’s certiﬁcate, and retrieve his pub-
lic key and biotoken for use in some protocol/transaction. BCAE is the root BCA,
signing every BCA’s certiﬁcate below it and biometrically authorizing all BCA rep-
resentatives, and having its certiﬁcate signed by the same BCAs.
Extending the protocols deﬁned in Section 24.9 of Schneier [34], we can support
authentication with stronger non-repudiation. For the following three protocols, pre-
sumeAlicehasestablishedacertiﬁcationpathtoBob,asdescribedabove,andBob’s
certiﬁcate, containing his public key and biotoken. The numbering of the protocols
is sequential, with each protocol after the ﬁrst relying on the protocol(s) before it.
3.2.1 The one-way protocol:
1. Alice generates a random number, RA.Beyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 17
2. Alice constructs a message, M = (TA;RA;IB;BBB(d)), where TA is Alice’s times-
tamp, IB is Bob’s identity, and d is a small piece of arbitrary data. d is embedded
into a bipartite biotoken BBB(d) that is generated from Bob’s biotoken.
3. Alice sends (CA;DA(M)) to Bob. (CA is Alice’s certiﬁcate; DA is Alice’s private
key.)
4. Bob veriﬁes CA and obtains EA. He makes sure these keys have not expired. (EA
is Alice’s public key).
5. Bob uses EA to decrypt DA(M). This veriﬁes both Alice’s signature and the in-
tegrity of the signed information.
6. Bob checks the IB in M for accuracy.
7. Bob checks the TA in M and conﬁrms that the message is current.
8. Bob submits a biometric sample to a sensor; a local biotoken BBL is then gener-
ated from the sample. BBL is then matched against BBB(d), releasing d.
9. As an option, Bob can check RA in M against a database of old random numbers
to ensure the message is not an old one being replayed.
This protocol is an improvement over the “signature server” protocol previously
introduced by Scheirer and Boult [32] for several reasons. Most obviously, it con-
sists of a single message, as opposed to a 4-way transaction, and establishes the
identities of both Alice and Bob and the integrity of any information sent from Al-
ice to Bob, especially if d is a shared secret. This protocol also works by encrypting
d with Bob’s public key - but with the biometric version, Bob does not need to have
his private key handy. Further security is provided if Alice has access to a private
BCA that holds Bob’s certiﬁcate, which would make Bob’s biotoken a shared secret.
Thus, a successful Man-in-the-Middle would need to know not only Alice’s private
key, but Bob’s secret stored biotoken and secret d, as well.
3.2.2 The two-way protocol:
10. Bob generates another random number, RB.
11. Bob constructs a message M0 = (TB;RB;IA;BAB(d)), where TB is Bob’s times-
tamp, IA is the identity of Alice, and d is the same data as in step 2. d is embedded
into a bipartite biotoken BAB(d) that is generated from Alice’s biotoken, obtained
from CA.
12. Bob sends DB(M0) to Alice.
13. Alice uses EB to decrypt DB(M0). This veriﬁes both Bob’s signature and the
integrity of the signed information.
14. Alice checks the IA in M0 for accuracy.
15. Alice checks the TB in M0 and conﬁrms that the message is current.
16. Alice submits a biometric sample to a sensor; a local biotoken BAL is then gen-
erated from the sample. BAL is then matched against BAB(d), releasing d. If this
d matches the d sent in the ﬁrst transmission, Alice can be assured that Bob’s
biometric was used to unlock BBB(d).
17. As an option, Alice can check RB in M0 to ensure the message is not an old one
being replayed.18 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
Now Alice has further assurance Bob is actually Bob, and not an impostor. But
Bob still has no assurance of Alice’s identity beyond her certiﬁcate. This can be
solved by a three-way protocol, where in addition to the original d, Bob also sends
a d0 in the same token (step 16). Alice can verify d (step 17), and send d0 back to
Bob for validation.
3.2.3 The three-way protocol:
18. Alice takes the recovered d0 from step 16, and sends DA(d0) back to Bob.
19. Bob uses EA to decrypt DA(d0), unlocking d0. Bob can be assured that Alice’s
biometric was used to unlock BAB(d) in step 17.
Fig. 11 The data-transfer steps for the one-way, two-way, and three-way protocols described in
Section 3.2. It is assumed that Alice has Bob’s certiﬁcate CB at the beginning of the one-way
protocol.
3.3 Revocation and Reissue
Unlike standard PKI, we cannot just revoke a certiﬁcate, generate a new random key
and re-issue - we must address the biometric re-issue as well. While many worksBeyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 19
in the research literature describe revocation as a property of a particular template
protection scheme, only one work [2] has gone as far as describing the revocation
procedure, albeit on a per template basis. Below we detail three different scenarios
for BKI protocol driven revocation and re-issue. When we describe compromise
here, we mean a compromise of the biotoken itself, and not the original biometric
features.
3.3.1 Scenario 1: Manual Re-issue
The BCA that issued the certiﬁcate must maintain a certiﬁcate revocation list (CRL).
This list only contains revoked certiﬁcates, and not expired certiﬁcates. If the user’s
key has been compromised, or the user’s biotoken has been compromised, or the
BCA’s key has been compromised, or because the BCA no longer wants to certify
the user, the user’s certiﬁcate can be revoked. In this scenario, it is presumed that
the BCA has not retained any transformation information necessary to invert the
biotoken it stores.
Fig. 12 The newly deﬁned CRN message for certiﬁcate revocation and re-issue.20 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
To begin the revocation process with re-enrollment, the BCA places the certiﬁ-
cate in question on its CRL, and notiﬁes the owner with a Certiﬁcate Re-issue No-
tiﬁcation (Figure 12) (CRN) via the contact information provided in the CSR. This
CRN is a new notice introduced in this work. If the owner is allowed to re-issue, a
new public-private key pair and a new biotoken are generated at the Auth Station.
This information is sent back to the BCA in the form of a new CSR. If this CSR is
accepted, a new certiﬁcate is issued.
In an alternate, yet valid, scenario for manual re-issue, re-enrollment is not re-
quired. If the user’s biotoken, or biotoken and key pair, has been compromised, and
the BCA possesses a stored uncompromised base biotoken that was used to gener-
ate the compromised biotoken, the owner can re-issue their certiﬁcate by varying the
transformations used for encoding on their end, while not needing to submit another
biometric sample. To begin this revocation process, the BCA places the certiﬁcate
in question on its CRL, and notiﬁes the owner with a CRN via the contact informa-
tion provided in the CSR. This CRN contains the owner’s base biotoken. The owner
will generate new keys for biotoken re-encoding, and use them to generate a new
biotoken. This new biotoken, and optionally a new public key, is sent back to the
BCA in a new CSR.
While two scenarios for automatic re-issue are discussed below, if a public key
and biotoken are compromised for a particular certiﬁcate, then manual re-issue with
re-enrollment will always be forced. Manual re-issue with re-enrollment is also
forced if the BCA’s key has been compromised, where trust can no longer be placed
in the existing data stored at the BCA.
3.3.2 Scenario 2: Automatic Re-issue of Biotoken
In cases where the BCA detects a compromise (especially in its own infrastructure)
of a stored biotoken, it is very desirable to revoke and re-issue certiﬁcates in some
automated fashion. To support this, the BCA must possess the necessary keys to
invertthetoken,andsubsequentlygenerateanewtokenbasedonstoredinformation.
This stored information need not be the original biometric features. Referring back
to the biotoken issue/re-issue tree of Figure 6, any level of token can be generated
by an Auth Station, and transmitted on to the BCA. Thus, if the biotoken exists at
the 2nd - nth level of encoding, any BCA (except possibly the root, as described in
Section 2) performing the inversion will not be able to recover the original biometric
features.
The initial enrollment process is modiﬁed in this scenario to transmit the trans-
formation key information used to create the enrollment biotoken to the BCA. The
CSR contains an optional ﬁeld (shown in Figure 9) to include a keyring with all
of the necessary keys / passwords / identiﬁers used to encrypt the stable (that is,
some encoding wj;n(wj;n 1;Tn), where n > 1, if the original biometric features are
to be protected) portion of the biotoken, during the transform. The requesting entity
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will store this encrypted keyring for later use if revocation and re-issue becomes
necessary.
If the user’s biotoken has been compromised, the user’s certiﬁcate can be revoked
and re-issued automatically. To begin the revocation process, the BCA places the
certiﬁcate in question on its CRL, and notiﬁes the owner via the contact information
provided in the CSR. If the owner is allowed to re-issue, the BCA will take it upon
itself to invert the biotoken back a level (to wj;n 1, where n > 1), generate a new set
of transformation key information, and re-encode the biotoken (producing w0
j;n). A
new certiﬁcate is then created with the new biotoken, and the original public key.
The BCA then sends the owner of the certiﬁcate a CRN, which indicates the serial
number of the revoked certiﬁcate, the serial number of the re-issued certiﬁcate, and
the new keyring for the new biotoken (encrypted with the user’s public key). This
message is signed by the BCA.
Automatic re-issue may happen transparently to the user, with the underlying
BKI software taking note of the CRN, and updating the transformation key infor-
mation for biotoken generation at the user’s Auth Station.
3.3.3 Scenario 3: Automatic Re-issue of key-pair
Similar to Scenario 2, it is very desirable to revoke and re-issue certiﬁcates in some
automated fashion when the public/private key-pair becomes compromised. To sup-
port this, the BCA can use a bipartite biotoken generated from the uncompromised
biotoken stored in the user’s certiﬁcate to convey a secret back to the user.
If the user’s key-pair has been compromised, the user’s certiﬁcate can be revoked
and reissued automatically. To begin the revocation process, the BCA places the
certiﬁcate in question on its CRL, and notiﬁes the owner via the contact information
provided in the CSR. If the owner is allowed to re-issue, the BCA will take it upon
itself to generate a new key-pair. A new certiﬁcate is then created with the new pub-
lic key, and the original biotoken. The BCA then embeds the new private key into
a bipartite biotoken generated from the user’s biotoken. The BCA then sends the
owner of the certiﬁcate a Certiﬁcate Re-issue Notiﬁcation (CRN), which indicates
the serial number of the revoked certiﬁcate, the serial number of the re-issued certiﬁ-
cate, and the bipartite biotoken containing the embedded private key. This message
is signed by the BCA.
The automatic re-issue process will require some intervention by the user here.
Namely, the user must submit his/her biometric at the Auth Station to release their
new private key from the bipartite biotoken in the CRN.
4 Applications
Now that we’ve seen the underlying infrastructure and protocols, we can begin to
think about the utility of BKI for different applications. Internet tools are of primary22 W.J. Scheirer, W. Bishop and T.E. Boult
interest, because they are at the front-line of the security battleground. Enforcing
server validation is a must, if we want to defeat Phishing and Man-in-the-Middle
attacks. In Section 3.2.1 we introduced a one-way protocol that is suitable for server
validation, and forces the user to take action by presenting a biometric sample when
receiving any certiﬁcate. For server validation, d can be a “welcome message” that
Bob enters during enrollment. The biometric component of this scheme forces Bob
to validate the integrity of the server, even if the certiﬁcate check has occurred,
and has been ignored. If Bob can unlock BBB(d) and get his “welcome message”
back, the server is indeed valid. If Bob’s biotoken is a shared secret, he has further
conﬁdence the server is legitimate. This protocol can be integrated into common
Internet tools, such as web browsers, email clients, and instant messaging clients
that already support PKI. The only difference to the user is that they are required to
submit a biometric sample upon receiving a certiﬁcate from a server.
In terms of network services, BKI enabled services can allow for robust authen-
tication, giving the user more conﬁdence in the server, and the server more conﬁ-
dence that it is dealing with a legitimate user. The work of [32] suggested the use
of bipartite biotokens with Kerberos [26], but in a standalone conﬁguration without
certiﬁcates certifying biotokens. One can also envision an S/Key-like [17] one-time
password scheme using bipartite biotokens. In this scheme, once receiving the re-
quest, the authentication server generates a one-time password, and creates a bipar-
tite biotoken containing this password. If the client matches the bipartite biotoken
sent from the authentication server, it will release the password, and complete the
authentication. In order to solve the biotoken distribution problem for network au-
thentication, PKI-enabled LDAP [6] can be used in the same manner for BKI ap-
plications. Thus, a wide variety of authentication schemes can take advantage of a
common certiﬁcate repository, including user records, keys, and biotokens.
Digital documents represent another important application area for BKI. Many
sensitive documents, including medical records, ﬁnancial records, and government
records are protected using PKI and digital signatures, but we cannot tell who ex-
actly is accessing these documents beyond knowing that a particular key unlocks
or veriﬁes them. Using biparite biotokens, the key used to encrypt a document that
belongs to Bob can be embedded into Bob’s bipartite biotoken. Thus, only Bob can
release the key, and access the document. For digital signatures, a signature server
protocol [32] can add a biometric authorization component to the standard signa-
ture process. Again, with BKI providing the certiﬁcate distribution mechanism, a
full security solution for document management is realized.
Inalloftheseapplications,usabilityis,ofcourse,alegitimateconcern.Byadding
a second physical factor, we also add more work for the user, and a small cost for
the additional sensor hardware. However, not much more work is required to submit
a biometric sample - it can be as simple as placing a ﬁnger down on a sensor for
just a few seconds. Thanks to the recent prevalence of biometric systems, many
corporate, government, and even home users are already used to this. Many laptops
are already equipped with inexpensive ﬁngerprint sensors, and many PC vendors
offer low-cost ﬁngerprint enabled mice. A good compromise is the judicious use of
the biometric component; if the user is very concerned about the security of theirBeyond PKI: The Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure 23
ﬁnancial activities, they may choose to only use BKI for particular sites related to
ﬁnancial services, and take their chances with more conventional PKI provisions for
everything else.
5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have taken a look at security issues with both PKI and biomet-
rics, and introduced a Biocryptographic Key Infrastructure incorporating a secure
template technology that solves problems with both. In summary, PKI suffers from
problems related to the trust that is presumed for all entities in the infrastructure. By
incorporating a secure biometric template technology such as revocable biotokens
into digital certiﬁcate signing requests, we can achieve improved non-repudiation,
and thus increase the trust placed in both certiﬁcate authorities and users, while ad-
dressing the biometric dilemma and biometric doppelganger attack. Moreover, with
a second factor that allows the secure transfer of embedded data, we can support
automatic certiﬁcate revocation and re-issue. Ultimately, the goal here is to prevent
common Phishing and Man-in-the-Middle attacks, which can be accomplished us-
ing the protocols we have deﬁned for secure authentication between two parties
using keys and biotokens. With the base protocols, we can go on to enhance com-
mon applications such as LDAP, Internet tools (browsers, email clients, IM clients),
and digital document signing.
Proposed standards for PKI including biometrics have been constrained to the
direct application of traditional biometric templates into certiﬁcates. Secure tem-
plate technologies, including revocable biotokens, have matured to the point of be-
ing useful for systems integration. To date, no formal document exists outlining
requirements or speciﬁcations for secure template technology, let alone a combi-
nation of secure templates and PKI. This hampers the widespread adoption of a
good two-factor solution to the shortcomings of PKI. Thus, we propose moving this
emerging paradigm out of the realm of pure research and into the hands of a stan-
dards body, such as IETF, for serious consideration. It is our hope that the sketch of
BKI presented here will provide a solid foundation to the ﬁrst round of a standards
process.
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